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Previous research on predictors of populism has predominantly focused on socio-economic 
(e.g., education, employment, social status), and socio-cultural factors (e.g., social identity 
and social status). However, during the last years, the role of negative emotions has become 
increasingly prominent in the study of populism. We conducted a cross-national survey in 15 
European countries (N=8059), measuring emotions towards the government and the elites, 
perceptions of threats about the future, and socio-economic factors as predictors of populist 
attitudes (the latter operationalized via three existing scales, anti-elitism, Manichaean 
outlook, people-centrism, and a newly developed scale on nativism). We tested the role of 
emotional factors in a deductive research design based on a structural model. Our results 
show that negative emotions (anger, contempt and anxiety) are better predictors of populist 
attitudes than mere socio-economic and socio-cultural factors. An inductive machine learning 
algorithm, Random Forest (RF), reaffirmed the importance of emotions across our survey 
dataset. 
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Explaining Populism across Europe 
Populism has been on the rise for some time across Europe (Rooduijn & Akkerman, 
2017) and numerous studies in communication research, political science, psychology and 
sociology have been published on explaining populism, ranging from the political system and 
opportunity structures (Salmela & von Scheve, 2018), the role of the media (Aalberg & de 
Vreese, 2016; Krämer, 2014; Schaub & Morisi, 2019; Schulz, Wirth, & Müller, 2018), 
communication styles (Abadi, 2017; Busby, Gubler, & Hawkins, 2019); de Vreese, Esser, 
Aalberg, Reinemann, & Stanyer, 2018; Nai, 2018), public health inequality (Lindström, 
2020), political participation (Zaslove, Geurkink, Jacobs, & Akkerman, 2020) and individual 
factors, such as personality characteristics (Bakker, Rooduijn, & Schumacher, 2016), or 
lower cognitive abilities (Hodson & Busseri, 2012).  
There are many debates about the exact conceptualization of populism (see 
Hameleers, Bos, & de Vreese, 2017; Hameleers, 2018; Schulz et al., 2017; Wirth et al., 2016; 
Wirz, 2018), yet, there is growing consensus that populism is defined by the opposition 
between 'the people' and 'the elites' (e.g., Rodrik, 2019). Several scholars have thus pleaded to 
pay more explicit attention to the role of emotions in explaining support for populist 
reasoning (e.g., Rhodes-Purdy, Navarre, & Utych, 2020; Salmela & Von Scheve, 2018). 
In this research, we examine three types of explanations for citizens’ support of 
populist views (see also Kyle & Gultchin 2018; Oesch, 2008). The first (1) relates to socio-
economic factors, implying that economic hardship explains why people embrace populist 
parties. The second (2) refers to socio-cultural determinants, i.e. the loss of cultural values, or 
threats to one’s social identity, while the third (3) focusses on the role of emotions. These 
three types of explanations are not mutually exclusive, and perhaps equally important. 
However, to date these explanations have mostly been examined in independent samples. In 
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our current study, we examine socio-economic, socio-cultural and emotional factors within 
the same sample.  
The Role of Socio-Economic Factors 
The first explanation for the support of populist arguments relates to socio-economic 
factors. At the individual level this economic hardship would explain the distrust of poor and 
low-educated people towards the government and the elites (Streeck, 2017). Indeed, previous 
studies have shown that economic insecurity, based on unemployment, bad employment 
prospects, or low income, is strongly associated with support for right-wing populist parties 
(e.g., Lubbers et al. ,2002). This can be observed at the individual level, but also at a country 
level. Increased economic uncertainties, especially for relatively low skilled workers in 
countries with high inequality between the rich and the poor, would be consistently 
associated with the growth of a right-wing populist electorate (e.g., Betz, 2018; Jay et al., 
2019; Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2002; Sprong et al., 2019; Swank & Betz, 2003). 
Interestingly, country-level indicators of unemployment are also important sources for 
individual perceptions of economic hardship. This points to the importance of relative 
deprivation, namely the subjective assessment that oneself or one’s group is worse off 
compared to other individuals or groups (Burgoon, van Noort, Rooduijn, & Underhill, 2018; 
Ellemers, 2002; Rooduijn and Burgoon; 2018; Smith & Ortiz, 2002). We expect that 
populism is stronger in countries with higher inequality where the socio-economic gap 
between 'the people' and 'the elites' is most visible (see also Franko & Witko, 2017).  
Social Identity  
The second type of explanation for the support for populism relates to socio-cultural 
determinants, i.e. the loss of cultural values, or threats to one’s identity. According to modern 
versions of social identity theory (Brown, 2000; Hogg, 2001a, 2001b), people derive their 
mental well-being and self-esteem not only from feeling good about themselves, but also 
5 
PREDICTORS OF POPULIST ATTITUDES ACROSS EUROPE 
  
 
about the important groups or country they belong to. In times of rapid and recurrent changes, 
either in one’s own life or in society at large, people start feeling threatened because their 
social identity is also object to change. Questions about who they are, where they come from, 
what kind of society they live in, all become more prominent in times of unpredictable 
changes (Abrams & Hogg, 2010; Brown, 2000; Hogg, 2001a; 2001b;), whereas derogating 
the out-group (in-group favoritism versus out-group derogation). In other words, the populist 
characteristic of ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’ reasoning (social categorization) can thus be seen as an 
immediate result of the perceived threat to one’s social identity.  
In sum, perceived threat, especially to one’s cultural values, may be considered an 
important determinant of populism. Feelings of threat should therefore be related with one’s 
social identity, and with the implied identification with one’s own country: the stronger one 
identifies with one’s own country, the more likely it is that one feels threatened by new 
values, belief systems or ideologies. 
Anxiety, Anger and Contempt 
Various studies have recently explored the role of emotions in the development of 
populist attitudes, extremism or negative attitudes towards out-groups, for example, by 
studying emotion-eliciting appeals instead of rational arguments (Wirz et al., 2018) or by 
showing that emotions not only lead to greater support, but also maintain support for populist 
parties (e.g., Nguyen, 2019). Emotions can be differentiated on the basis of the appraisals of 
the situation (positive - negative, self-blame – other-blame, certain – uncertain, in control – 
not in control, etc.), and on the basis of motivational tendencies, such as the motivation to 
attack or to withdraw (see Lazarus, 2001; Lerner, Li, Valdesolo, & Kassam, 2015; Hameleers 
et al., 2017; Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001). 
Anger seems one of the most prominent emotions in eliciting populist views (e.g., 
Hameleers et al., 2017; Nguyen, 2019; Rico, Guinjoan, & Anduiza, 2017; 2020). Anger is 
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elicited when one’s goals are frustrated, and a person’s behavior or an event is appraised as 
negative and unfair, while the other party is to blame (rather than oneself). This set of 
appraisals generally leads to criticism, or (verbal or physical) attack, in order to remove the 
obstacle to one’s goal (e.g., Frijda, 1986; Moors, Ellsworth, Scherer, & Frijda, 2013; 
Roseman, 1984). We propose that contempt may also play a role in populist attitudes, as a 
close alternative to anger. Contempt implies the derogation of the other person, appraising the 
other not only as to blame, but as inferior. These appraisals lead to the tendency to exclude or 
ignore the person completely, because the target is not even worth attacking (e.g., Fischer & 
Giner-Sorrolla, 2016). Citizens may feel both anger and contempt in reaction to the actions of 
the government and the elites, which may fuel populist rhetoric. In fact, anger and contempt 
may also lead to different types of collective action: anger has been associated with legal 
protest and normative action, and contempt with illegal and violent actions (Tausch et al., 
2011), because the latter emotion implies no commitment with authorities or the government 
anymore, thereby allowing actions that are destructive.  
In addition to anger and contempt, fear or anxiety has also been mentioned as a 
central emotion in populist reasoning. Indeed, when citizens feel threatened, either because of 
economic hardships or the loss of their cultural identity, this leads to out-group derogation, 
which is also a key feature of populism (e.g., Nguyen, 2019; Wirz et al., 2018). Thus, 
different emotions may play a role in the development of populist attitudes. 
The Current Study 
In the current study, we measured socio-economic, socio-cultural and emotional 
factors and inspected to what extent they can explain populist attitudes in a large sample of 
15 European countries. Whereas there are obviously differences between these countries, in 
this research we do not focus on cross-national differences, but on the relations between these 
different types of variables and populist attitudes.  
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We examined three clusters of factors in relation to Populist Attitudes. Socio-
economic factors were included at the individual-level (participants’ Education and 
Employment), as well as the country-level (Inequality Index), in order to tap relative 
economic deprivation.). Socio-cultural factors were measured by a scale of relative social 
deprivation: Subjective Social Status and Social Identity (operationalized as the identification 
with one’s current country). Emotional factors included measures of Anxiety (operationalized 
by realistic and symbolic threat), Anger and Contempt (operationalized as shared appraisals).  
We will analyze this step by step, by subsequently answering the following research 
questions (RQs): 
RQ1. What is the relationship between socio-economic factors (Inequality Index, 
Education and Employment), socio-cultural factors (Subjective Social Status, Social Identity), 
emotional factors (Anxiety, Anger, Contempt) and Populist Attitudes? 
RQ2. How do the interactions between socio-economic factors and socio-cultural 
factors affect Populist Attitudes?  
RQ3. Do socio-cultural factors individual-level socio-economic factors and emotional 
factors mediate the effects of country-level socio-economic factors towards Populist 
Attitudes? 
Methods and Design 
After reporting the means, standard deviations and correlations of all included 
variables, we conducted a Path Analysis, which is a special case of Structural Equation 
Modeling (SEM). In a basic SEM model, we tested the hypothesis whether emotional factors 
(Anxiety, Contempt and Anger) mediate the effect of Inequality Index on Populist Attitudes. 
In an advanced SEM model, we tested the additional effects of participants’ socio-economic 
factors (Education and Employment) and socio-cultural factors (Subjective Social Status, 
Social Identity) on Populist Attitudes. 
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Sampling Procedure and Data Collection 
We examined our research questions in a large-scale cross-national study across 15 
European countries.1 The variety of European countries of different socio-economic 
structures and political cultures allowed us to include differences in inequality within a 
country, in addition to individual level variables. Our desired representative sample size 
amounted to approximately 500 respondents per country, while quotas based on current UN-
census data (UNdata) were set up for age, gender and geographical region. The key eligibility 
criterion for respondents was having lived in their current country of residence for at least 10 
years, which we consider as a sufficient time frame to feel at home in the country of 
residence. In the Informed Consent respondents were instructed about the purpose of our 
study, their voluntary participation and guaranteed privacy based on GDPR regulations. We 
obtained ethical approval from the Faculty Ethics Review Board of the University of 
Amsterdam (Number 2019-SP-10754).  
Survey  
The survey started with information about the study and the request for informed 
consent (see Supplemental Material). All respondents were required to give informed consent 
before they could proceed to the actual questions. Unless specified otherwise and except for 
demographics and media usage behavior, respondents were requested to indicate their 
agreement with a statement on a 7-point Likert-scale, ranging from strongly agree to strongly 
disagree. Our survey mainly included existing scales2. Cronbach's Alpha (α) is the most 
                                               
1 Our sampled 15 countries include Bosnia-Herzegovina, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom. 
2 In some cases, we used shortened versions of the original scale, in order to prevent the questionnaire from 
becoming too long. Further scales included in our survey were: Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ; 
Bruder, Haffke, Neave, Nouripanah & Imhoff, 2013), Need for Closure (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011), Emotional 
Partisan Attachment (Bankert, Huddy & Rosema, 2017) and Political Efficacy (European Social Survey ESS, 
International Social Survey Programme, Eurobarometer). 
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common measure of internal consistency ("reliability") of survey items and it is used here to 
determine how reliable our multiple Likert-scale questions are.3  
Populist Attitudes 
This scale was based on existing items by Castanho Silva, Jungkunz, Helbling and 
Littvay (2019), consisting of People-Centrism (e.g., "Politicians should always listen closely 
to the problems of the people", Anti-Elitism (e.g., "The government is pretty much run by a 
few big interests looking out for themselves"), and Manichaean Outlook (e.g., "You can tell 
if a person is good or bad if you know their political views"). We also added three items to 
measure Nativism, such as "The political elites have failed to protect our cultural identity". 
Nativism focuses on the idea that people being native to a country believe to have more rights 
to be treated fairly, and to receive priority treatments when living in the country of birth 
(Betz, 2017; Hochschild, 2018; Heiss & Matthes, 2019; Mudde, 2012), while ‘foreigners’ and 
elites behaving ‘foreign’ are considered a threat to the native nation (Kešić & Duyvendak 
2019). The ten items formed a reliable scale (Cronbach’s α = .66). While this value is not 
high, it lies in the commonly referred as "acceptable" range for Cronbach’s Alpha (α). 
Further, the scale is based on and supported by previous research (see Castanho Silva et al., 
2018, p. 158), in which items were chosen based on scalar invariance, average loadings, and 
distributional characteristics, including at least one negative-worded item in each subscale. 
Based on an initial CFA assessment, only the original formulation of three scales were 
recommended, such as Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove (2014); Castanho Silva et al. (2018), 
and Schulz et al. (2018). Originally, this had resulted in at least four items per sub-scale with 
invariant factor loadings across all eight samples for each construct plus few invariant 
intercepts across all countries, thus making them suitable for cross-national comparisons. The 
addition of three Nativism items did not affect the reliability score negatively, further 
                                               
3 Further variables were measured but are not be reported in the present study. 
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supporting the sufficient reliability of this scale. 
Socio-Economic Factors  
Inequality Index. We included the Inequality Index per country, which is based on 
the latest Inequality of Income Distribution4 (INDIC-IL) data as provided by Eurostat. 
INDIC-IL describes the S80/S20 income quintile share ratio by sex and selected age group 
based on latest EU-SILC and ECHP surveys (Table 1). Higher scores indicate higher 
inequality in each country. 
Table 1 
Inequality Index per Country based on latest Inequality of Income Distribution (INDIC-IL) 
Country Inequality Index 
Czech Republic  3.4 
Slovakia  3.5 
Netherlands  4 
Denmark  4.1 
Hungary  4.3 
France  4.4 
Germany   4.5 
Poland  4.6 
United Kingdom  5.4 
Bosnia-Herzegovina  5.7 
Italy  5.9 
Greece  6.1 
Spain  6.6 
Lithuania  7.3 
Turkey  8.7 
 
Education and Employment. Education level was dimensioned across low (up to 
high school degree), middle (technical/vocational degree) and high levels (university degree). 
For Employment status, participants could check the following categories: unemployed, 
retired, student and (self)employed. 
                                               




PREDICTORS OF POPULIST ATTITUDES ACROSS EUROPE 
  
 
Subjective Social Status. We used the MacArthur Scale of Subjective Social Status 
(Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, & Ickovics, 2000), which depicts an ascending ladder between zero 
and ten, measuring the perceived socio-economic status of respondents. 
Social Identity. This scale was based on Ellemers, Spears and Doosje (2002), Self 
and Social Identity and used three items: "Do you feel [British]?", "Being [British] is an 
important part of who I am", and "Do you feel at home in [the UK]?". The three items formed 
a reliable scale (Cronbach’s α= .82); higher scores reflect more identification with the 
country in question. 
Anxiety. This scale was based on 8 existing items, measuring realistic and symbolic 
threats (Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2009). However, Cronbach’s Alphas (α) for both 
realistic and symbolic threats were unsatisfactory, and we therefore decided to collapse 6 
items into one scale, which reflect participants’ anxiety about their own well-being, both in 
terms of economic conditions, as well as their cultural identity (e.g., "I am anxious about 
what the future will bring" and "The immigration of people from many other countries is a 
threat to my values". The six items formed a reliable scale (Cronbach’s α = .65). 
Anger. We developed a scale based on previous appraisal items measuring anger 
(Fischer & Roseman, 2007) and applying them to appraisals related to the government, the 
elites and the people. We decided not to ask participants directly about their anger at the 
government, because of their potential fear for retaliation, but instead to point out how people 
around them thought about a statement, e.g., "Many people around me think that the 
government has betrayed us". Although this phrasing is not similar to asking people how they 
feel themselves, we assumed that their friends’ and intimates’ feelings about a topic can be 
generally viewed as a proxy for their own feelings. The five items formed a reliable scale 
(Cronbach’s α = .84). 
Contempt. Similar to Anger, this variable was measured by tapping into appraisals of 
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how people around them think. We used three items that have shown to best describe 
Contempt, namely derogation and exclusion: "Many people around me would like to get rid 
of politicians". The three items formed a reliable scale (Cronbach’s α = .73). 
Demographics. Our survey also included background questions regarding gender, 
age, religion, ethnicity and marital status, which will not be reported in the current 
manuscript (see Supplemental Material). 
Procedure 
The survey was first developed in English and then translated into 14 other languages 
by native speakers of our consortium partners, before being back-translated to English. In 
addition, each survey version was individualized based on country specifications, such as 
country name and language terms. All translated surveys were uploaded on Qualtrics online 
survey platform (Version: July 2019) and the survey data were collected after being 
synchronized with a global research platform (Cint), which provided us a heterogeneous pool 
of survey respondents across the 15 European countries involved in our project.  
A pre-test with 50 respondents per country was run to evaluate the survey time taken 
(on average between 11 and 15 min). It also aimed to assess the clarity of survey items and its 
suitability to respondents across various countries. Our pre-test results were satisfactory and 
no further survey revisions were required. In total, our survey resulted in 9995 respondents, 
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Our survey sample included quotas based on current UN-census data set up for age, 
gender and geographical region (See Supplemental Material).5  
Relations between Variables (RQ1). Table 2 presents the means, standard 
deviations, and inter-correlations of the variables in this study (see also Figure 1).  
Table 2  
Means, Standard Deviations, and Inter-Correlations of Variables (*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p 
<.001) 









Index 5.22 1.39 -                 
Education 3.80 1.67 0.167***  -               
Employment 3.80 1.46 0.028*  0.19***  -             
Subjective 
Social Status 5.52 1.88 0.014 -0.061*** -0.085*** -           
Social 
Identity 6.16 1.10 -0.022*  -0.031**  0.005 -0.06*** -         
Anger 5.31 1.15 0.054***  -0.012 0.039***  0.042***  -0.032**  -       
Anxiety 4.04 1.09 0.127***  -0.068***  0.044***  0.042***  -0.083***  0.289***  -     
Contempt 5.19 1.21 0.048***  -0.035**  0.057***  0.014 -0.056*** 0.726***  0.318***  -   
Populist 
Attitudes 4.94 0.77 0.018 -0.084*** 0.017 0.021 0.068***  0.562***  0.437***  0.551***  - 
 
Overall, there is no significant correlation between socio-economic factors (Inequality 
Index, Employment and Education) and Populist Attitudes, except for a very small, i.e. 
meaningless, negative correlation with Education. Moreover, there is no correlation between 
socio-cultural factors (Subjective Social Status) and Populist Attitudes, although there is a 
very small correlation between Social Identity and Populist Attitudes. And, there is only a 
very small correlation between socio-economic and emotional factors. On the other hand, the 
correlations between, Anger, Contempt and Anxiety with Populist Attitudes are relatively 
                                               
5 A Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) showed no significant differences in these key variables 
across 15 European countries. 
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strong (between .40 and .56). Anger and Contempt are also highly correlated with each other, 




Figure 1. Correlation Matrix between Variables (scale between -0.8 and 0.8). 
 
In sum, our correlations show that the relationship between emotional factors 
(Anxiety, Anger, Contempt) and Populist Attitudes is much stronger than between socio-
economic (Inequality Index, Education, Employment) as well as socio-cultural factors 
(Perceived Social Status, Social Identity) and Populist Attitudes.  
Path Analysis (PA) 
 Next, we investigated how the interactions between socio-economic factors 
(Inequality Index, Education and Employment) and socio-cultural factors (Subjective Social 
Status, Social Identity) affect Populist Attitudes (RQ2). We included an objective country-
level socio-economic factor (Inequality Index) as an exogenous variable (not caused), which 
15 
PREDICTORS OF POPULIST ATTITUDES ACROSS EUROPE 
  
 
would consider country differences, and in order to explore its relationship with further 
factors and Populist Attitudes.  
First, we examined whether emotional factors (Anxiety, Anger and Contempt) mediate 
the relation between our country-level variable Inequality Index and Populist Attitudes. This 
hypothesis was tested with a Path Analysis (PA), which is a type of multiple regression (a) to 
estimate the parameters of a structural model and (b) to assess various mediation effects 
(Gunzler, Chen, Wu, & Zhang, 2013). Moreover, it is the application of Structural Equation 
Modeling (SEM) by using observed variables only, devoid of any latent variables. For SEM, 
which is a deductive research design, we used the lavaan-package in R (Rosseel, 2012). The 
model fit of a SEM model is assessed using the chi-square test, the comparative fit index 
(CFI), the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), and the standardized root 
mean square residual (SRMR). According to Hu and Bentler (1999) and Kline (2015), a 
reasonable fit is indicated by a non-significant chi-square (divided by the degrees of freedom 
in case of large sample sizes), a CFI value >.95, an RMSEA smaller than .06, and an SRMR 
smaller than .08.  
Our basic SEM model (Figure 2) shows a significantly strong prediction effect 
(standardized) of Anger (ß = .29) and Contempt (ß = .32) on Populist Attitudes (ß = .28) 
mediated by Anxiety, resulting in the following fit indices: chi-square (2) = 2.96, p = .227, 
chi-square/degrees of freedom = 1.48, CFI = 1.0, RMSEA = .008 with the 90% confidence 
interval [.000–.025], and SRMR = .004. 
We conducted a Wald Test (equivalent to a Z-test), which tests the relationship 
between independent variables (predictors) and the dependent variable and the effect of 
dropping parameters (i.e., regression paths) by comparing nested models. Our Wald-Test did 
not suggest any regressions paths to be removed, because the p-values given for the Z-
statistic P(>|z|) were all lower than the conventional threshold of .05 and hence significant. 
16 
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The covariance path between Anger and Contempt was added due to the high correlation of 
the observed factors, and despite not shown explicitly in Figure 2, the double arrow shows 
the residual covariance, since Anger and Contempt are endogenous variables. 
 
Figure 2. Basic Structural Equation Model (standardized; N=8059). Only significant paths 
with a standard estimate larger than 0.05 are depicted (double-headed arrows = residual 
covariance paths; single-headed arrows = regressions paths). 
 
Several mediation effects are found in our basic SEM model. While there is a direct 
path from Inequality Index towards Populist Attitudes, we explore the mediation in this 
relationship through emotional factors. At the same time, Anger and Contempt mediate the 
effect of Anxiety towards Populist Attitudes. All these effects were tested for significance 
using bootstrap based p-values. The total effect from the Inequality Index to Populist 
Attitudes is the only non-significant effect. On the one hand, this may seem contradictory, but 
17 
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it stems from the fact that the direct path is negative, while all other mediating paths are 
positive, therefore canceling each other out and rendering the total combined effect of direct 
and indirect effects from Inequality Index to Populist Attitudes non-significant and negligible. 
This phenomenon is called inconsistent mediation (MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007). All 
other effects are significant - the explained variance (R2) of Populist Attitudes for this SEM 
model is 0.427, which is moderately high, a more than satisfactory result in this context. In 
addition, although Anxiety has a large direct effect on Populist Attitudes (ß = .28 
standardized), the indirect effects through Anger and Contempt are also considerable (ß = .17 
standardized). Although the direct effect of Anxiety on Populist Attitudes, when tested 
without mediators, was of the same magnitude (ß = .44 standardized), the overall explained 
variance (R2) for Populist Attitudes (as a dependent variable) became 0.192, much smaller 
than before. These different mediation paths in the SEM model show the importance of 
emotional factors in mediating the country level effect of Inequality Index.  
Next, we examined how socio-economic (Education and Employment) and socio-
cultural factors (Subjective Social Status and Social Identity) as well as emotional factors 
(Anxiety, Anger and Contempt) mediate the effects of the country-level socio-economic 
factors (Inequality Index) towards Populist Attitudes (RQ3). In an advanced SEM model 
(Figure 3), we tested the indirect (mediation) effects of socio-cultural factors (Social Identity, 
Subjective Social Status) as well as socio-economic factors (Employment, Education), in 
order to compare their influence with the emotional factors. In this case, we removed the 
regression path from the Inequality Index towards Anxiety, making the latter an exogenous 
variable due to the results observed in our basic SEM model, while adding a covariance path 
between both, which is a common rule with exogenous variables (see Kline, 2015). This 
advanced SEM model had the following fit indices: chi-square (20) = 625.675, p < .001, chi-
square/degrees of freedom = 31.28, CFI = .952, RMSEA = .061 with the 90% confidence 
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interval [.057–.065], and SRMR = .040. Despite the chi-square being significant, the rest of 
the fit indices indicate a rather good fit, especially considering the large sample size (8059).  
 
Figure 3. Advanced Structural Equation Model (standardized; N=8059). Double-headed 
arrows = residual covariance paths; single-headed arrows = regressions paths. 
 
In this advanced SEM model (Figure 3), the added socio-economic and socio-cultural 
factors mediate the effect of the Inequality Index towards Populist Attitudes, but in contrast to 
the basic SEM model, many of these effects were non-significant. In fact, only Education had 
a significant mediation effect. Moreover, all these effects were negative, both indirect and 
direct, with no inconsistent mediation as found in the basic SEM model (Figure 2), making 
the total (indirect + direct) effect from Inequality Index significant, although rather small (ß = 
-.05 standardized), as well as negative. On the other hand, the effects of emotional factors on 
Populist Attitudes are positive; the total effect from Anxiety mediated by Anger and Contempt 
is significant and large in comparison with socioeconomic factors (ß = .447 standardized).6 
Overall, the explained (standardized) variance for the model of Populist Attitudes was 0.446 
in this case, only 0.019 larger than our basic SEM model (Figure 2), showing that neither 
                                               
6 These mentioned standardized values stem from the mediation analysis and represent the combined effect 
(direct and indirect) and are therefore not shown in any SEM models, while the latter show direct effects only. 
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socio-economic nor socio-cultural factors do contribute much in explaining Populist 
Attitudes, while emotional factors do.  
If we re-specify our advanced SEM model (Figure 3) by removing variables 
suggested by the Wald Test, since the paths from Employment and Subjective Social Status to 
Populist Attitudes were non-significant, we get a new advanced SEM model (Figure 4), with 
partly improved fit indices: chi-square (9) = 150.841, p < .001, chi-square/degrees of freedom 
= 16.67, CFI = .988, RMSEA = .044 with the 90% confidence interval [.038–.051], and 
SRMR = .027. Again, the only issue is the significance of the chi-square. The explained 
variance (R2) for Populist Attitudes only decreased by 0.001, confirming that Employment 
and Subjective Social Status were non-relevant. 
 
Figure 4. Wald Test for the Advanced Structural Equation Model (standardized; N=8059). 
Only significant paths with a p-values smaller than 0.05 depicted (double-headed arrows = 
residual covariance paths; single-headed arrows = regressions paths). 
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Due to our large sample size (N=8059) the fit estimates of this SEM model are 
sufficient, but still poor (see Wolf, Harrington, Clark, & Miller, 2013). Therefore, we tested 
the same SEM model against a smaller independent random sample (N=403) equally 
distributed across 15 countries, resulting in the slightly improved fit indices: chi-square (9) = 
12.460, p = .189, chi-square/degrees of freedom = 1.38, CFI = .994, RMSEA = .031 with the 
90% confidence interval [.000–.068], and SRMR = .028. These results prove that the large 
sample size (N=8059) had affected the significance of our previous results. Moreover, the 
total effect of Inequality Index and the mediation by socio-economic and socio-cultural 
factors became non-significant, while the explained variance (R2) for Populist Attitudes 
remained in a similar range (0.420), further confirming our earlier SEM models.  
Random Forest Prediction 
At this step, our rationale was to test and confirm our previous deductive SEM models 
and to complement it with an inductive machine learning algorithm, without deploying any 
preconceived assumptions regarding our hypotheses. This implies that the algorithm does not 
know and has not previously used our above-mentioned advanced SEM models. We applied 
the supervised machine learning algorithm Random Forest (RF), in order to train a classifier 
model and to predict Populist Attitudes, while removing the variables/features directly 
correlated to it. RF is considered as a modern methodology in behavioral and psychological 
research (e.g., Orrù, Monaro, Conversano, Gemignani, & Sartori, 2020). 
RF describes a large-scale (supervised) machine learning experiment and is defined as 
a meta estimator and regressor, which fits an amount of classifying decision trees on various 
sub-samples of the dataset (see also scikit-learn machine learning kit in Python, including 
RandomForestClassifier and RandomForestRegressor7). RF algorithm uses so-called 
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Bagging (or Bootstrap Aggregation), which consists of building multiple different decision 
tree models from a single training dataset by repeatedly using multiple bootstrapped subsets 
of the data and averaging the models (Lee, Ullah, & Wang, 2020). This means that at each 
splitting step of the tree algorithm, a random sample of n predictors is chosen as split 
candidates from the full set of predictors. RF can be used for both classification (predicting a 
categorical variable) and regression (predicting a continuous variable) (Bruce & Bruce; 2017; 
James, Witten, Hastie, & Tibshirani, 2017, p.18). 
We split the data in order to have a training set with 70% of the original data and 30% 
as test set, since we are not performing any hyperparameter tuning due to the fact we are 
interested in the feature importance we had no need for a validation set. At computing RF 
regression trees, the prediction error is measured by the root mean square error (RMSE) on 
the test set containing 30% of the data, which corresponds to the average difference between 
the observed known values of the outcome and the predicted value by the model. The lower 
the RMSE, the better is the prediction model. The overall RMSE for the test set amounts to 
0.58, which displays how the model is able to approximately capture the pattern of the scale 
Populist Attitudes, showing a high variance and implying the error size. Table 3 displays 
results (normalized values) for 10 test-respondent predictions by applying RF. For example, 
for test-sample 7 the (actual) Gold value for Populist Attitudes is 0.010301, while the model 
predicted it as 0.009417, which is remarkably close, considering that our RF model has 
neither known this test-respondent before, nor previously deployed the variables as listed in 
the feature importance plot. 
Table 3 
Random Forest Prediction (10 tests) and Absolute Errors (normalized values) 
Tests Predictions Gold Values Errors 
0 0.166109 0.195487 0.029378 
1 0.044629 0.047338 0.002709 
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2 0.115146 0.380672 0.265525 
3 -0.03514 0.047338 0.082479 
4 -0.035216 0.047338 0.082554 
5 0.151051 0.121412 0.029639 
6 0.020668 -0.082291 0.102959 
7 0.009417 0.010301 0.000884 
8 -0.022655 0.065857 0.088512 
9 -0.101012 -0.063773 0.037239 
 
Overall, our prediction results were sufficient enough for the sample since our aim is 
not to use the RF model as a predictor, but rather to consider the feature importance plot. 
Figure 5 shows how Anger, Contempt and Anxiety (emotional factors) present the most 
important features in predicting Populist Attitudes across our survey dataset, which is 
consistent with our SEM analysis results from previous sections. 
 
Figure 5. Random Forest Prediction (Relative Importance of Variables). 
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Previous research on populism has mainly tested one type of explanation 
simultaneously. In this study, we scrutinized the relative importance of different explanations 
of populist attitudes simultaneously. We included predictors tapping socio-economic 
explanations, both at the country level and at the individual level, as well as socio-cultural 
explanations and emotions. By applying SEM models, we found compelling evidence for the 
relative strong impact of emotional factors on populist attitudes, whereas socio-economic and 
socio-cultural factors did not add much in explaining variance in populist attitudes. In order 
to further back up our findings based on SEM, an inductive machine learning algorithm, 
Random Forest (RF), reaffirmed the importance of emotions, relative to socio-economic and 
socio-cultural factors, by ascribing them a much larger weight in predicting populist attitudes. 
Our results thus confirm recent theorizing and research that populism is better 
predicted by (negative) emotions (e.g., Aslanidis, 2020; Nguyen, 2019; Salmela & von 
Scheve, 2017; Wirz et al., 2018) than by objective socio-economic factors (Rooduijn & 
Burgoon, 2018) or socio-cultural explanations (e.g., Brown, 2000; Hogg, 2001a, 2001b). Our 
basic SEM model, testing emotions as mediators between inequality at the country level, 
explained populist attitudes to a reasonable degree, and our advanced SEM model, which also 
included socio-economic and socio-cultural factors, did not explain any added variance above 
and beyond emotions in predicting populist attitudes. Furthermore, our advanced SEM model 
showed that socio-economic factors mediated the effect of inequality on populist attitudes, 
however, many of these effects were non-significant, whereas emotional factors were the 
most effective in explaining populist attitudes. Thus, emotional factors are indeed the main 
factor that predicts populist attitudes, while socio-economic factors, due to their low 
explained variance (R2), did not play a major role as mediators of inequality or as direct 
predictors of populist attitudes. 
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In addition, in contrast to previous research (Rico et al., 2017; 2020), we provide 
empirical evidence that all three negative emotions play an important role in explaining 
populist attitudes, and although Anxiety did play a major role, Anger and Contempt also 
appear to be important, as recently suggested by Nguyen (2019). These emotions are likely to 
reflect people’s negative feelings about their current socio-economic or socio-cultural status. 
In other words, individuals who regularly experience certain emotions are likely to interpret 
one’s own socio-economic situation or position in society according to similar dimensions of 
threat, unfairness, frustration or derogation (see Lerner et al., 2015). 
An alternative explanation for the strong relation between emotions and populist 
attitudes could be that some items used in our scales for measuring emotions resemble items 
measuring populist views of survey respondents. Checking the overlap in meanings of the 
items in both scales, however, we do not believe that the similarity is substantial. Only the 
Anti-Elitism scale may contain implicit Anger items, such as ‘quite a few of the people 
running the government are crooked’, however this scale did not correlate stronger with the 
Anger or Contempt items than other scales, hence we do not believe that this alternative 
interpretation holds. 
Research Limitations 
One clear strength of this study is that it includes a large, representative and diverse 
sample from 15 different European countries, testing different types of explanations. 
However, we should also acknowledge some limitations. The first is the marginal reliability 
score of our Populist Attitudes scale (Cronbach’s α = .66), which is explained by the 
differences between countries in the Cronbach’s Alpha’s (α) for this scale. These differences 
are not explored in our research, because our current analysis does not focus on cross-
national differences. Another limitation could be the social desirability bias of survey 
respondents, which has especially been identified for constructs, such as the need for 
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affiliation, conformity, approval, or (lack of) self-disclosure (Johnson & Van de Vijver, 
2003). For our present research, it could apply to the emotion items, however, we phrased 
questions about negative emotions towards the government as a statement about the opinion 
of other people rather than their own feelings. In addition, we included reversed and positive 
emotions, and randomized all questions within the same scale.  
We should also note that our (SEM analysis) measures do not clearly differentiate 
between various types of populism, such as left- and right-wing populism, across different 
countries. Therefore, we cannot determine how much of the explained variance (R2) for 
populist attitudes stems from left- and right-wing voters.  
Future Research  
We hope to inspire other researchers to focus more on emotional factors when 
examining populism. As a means to bridge our SEM study with future research, we 
recommend to complement explanatory modeling with predictive modeling, such as 
computational experiments and deep learning algorithms, and to deploy experimental designs 








Aalberg, T., & de Vreese, C. H. (2016). Introduction: Comprehending populist political 
 communication. In Populist political communication in Europe (pp. 13-21). 
 Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315623016 
Abadi, D. (2017). Negotiating group identities in multicultural Germany: The role of 
 mainstream media, discourse relations, and political Alliances. Lanham, MD: 
 Lexington Books. 
Abrams, D., & Hogg, M. A. (2010). Social identity and self-categorization. In J. F. Dovidio, 
 M. Hewstone, P. Glick, & V. M. Esses (Eds.), The SAGE handbook of prejudice, 
 stereotyping and discrimination (pp. 179–193). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE. 
 https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446200919.n11 
Adler, N. E., Epel, E. S., Castellazzo, G., & Ickovics, J. R. (2000). Relationship of subjective 
 and objective social status with psychological and physiological functioning: 
 Preliminary data in healthy, White women. Health Psychology, 19(6), 586-592. 
 https://doi.org/10.1037/0278-6133.19.6.586 
Akkerman, A., Mudde, C., & Zaslove, A. (2014). How populist are the people? Measuring 
 populist attitudes in voters. Comparative political studies, 47(9), 1324-1353. 
 https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414013512600 
Aslanidis, P. (2020). The Social Psychology of Populism. Mapping Populism: Approaches 
 and Methods, 16. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429295089-16 
Bakker, B. N., Rooduijn, M., & Schumacher, G. (2016). The psychological roots of populist 
 voting: Evidence from the United States, the Netherlands and Germany. European 
 Journal of Political Research, 55(2), 302-320. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-
 6765.12121 
Bankert, A., Huddy, L., & Rosema, M. (2017). Measuring partisanship as a social identity in 
27 
PREDICTORS OF POPULIST ATTITUDES ACROSS EUROPE 
  
 
 multi-party systems. Political behavior, 39(1), 103-132. 
 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-016-9349-5 
Betz, H. G. (2017). Nativism across time and space. Swiss Political Science Review, 23(4), 
 335-353. https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12260 
Betz, H. G. (2018). The radical right and populism. The Oxford Handbook of the radical 
 right, 86-104. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274559.013.5 
Brown, R. (2000). Social identity theory: Past achievements, current problems and future 
 challenges. European Journal of Social Psychology, 30(6), 745-778. 
 https://doi.org/10.1002/1099-0992(200011/12)30:6<745::AID-EJSP24>3.0.CO;2-O 
Bruce, P., & Bruce, A. (2017). Practical statistics for data scientists: 50 essential concepts. 
 O'Reilly Media, Inc. 
Bruder, M., Haffke, P., Neave, N., Nouripanah, N., & Imhoff, R. (2013). Measuring 
 individual differences in generic beliefs in conspiracy theories across cultures: 
 Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire. Frontiers in psychology, 4, 225. 
 https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00225 
Burgoon, B., van Noort, S., Rooduijn, M., & Underhill, G. R. (2018). Radical right populism 
 and the role of positional deprivation and inequality (No. 733). LIS Working Paper 
 Series. Retrieved from https://ideas.repec.org/p/lis/liswps/733.html 
Busby, E. C., Gubler, J. R., & Hawkins, K. A. (2019). Framing and blame attribution in 
 populist rhetoric. The Journal of Politics, 81(2), 616-630. 
 https://doi.org/10.1086/701832 
Castanho Silva, B., Andreadis, I., Anduiza, E., Blanuša, N., Morlet Corti, Y., Delfino, G., 
 Rico, G., Littvay, L. (2018). “Public Opinion Surveys: A New Scale.” In The 
 Ideational Approach to Populism: Theory, Method & Analysis, edited by Kirk 
 Hawkins, Ryan Carlin, Levente Littvay, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, 150-178. 
28 
PREDICTORS OF POPULIST ATTITUDES ACROSS EUROPE 
  
 
 London: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315196923-8 
Castanho Silva, B., Jungkunz, S., Helbling, M., & Littvay, L. (2019). An Empirical 
 Comparison of Seven Populist Attitudes Scales. Political Research Quarterly, 
 1065912919833176. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912919833176 
Ellemers, N. (2002). Social identity and relative deprivation. In I. Walker & H. J. Smith 
 (Eds.), Relative deprivation: Specification, development and integration (pp. 239-
 264). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 
 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511527753.011 
Ellemers, N., Spears, R., & Doosje, B. (2002). Self and social identity. Annual review of 
 psychology, 53(1), 161-186. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.53.100901.135228 
Fischer, A. H., & Roseman, I. J. (2007). Beat them or ban them: The characteristics and 
 social functions of anger and contempt. Journal of Personality and Social 
 Psychology, 93(1), 103-115. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.93.1.103 
Fischer, A., & Giner-Sorolla, R. (2016). Contempt: Derogating others while keeping 
 calm. Emotion Review, 8(4), 346-357. https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073915610439 
Franko, W.W. & Witko, C. (2017). The new economic populism. How states respond to 
economic inequality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190671013.001.0001  
Frijda, N. H. (1986). The Emotions. Cambridge University Press. 
Gunzler, D., Chen, T., Wu, P., & Zhang, H. (2013). Introduction to mediation analysis with 
 structural equation modeling. Shanghai archives of psychiatry, 25(6), 390. Retrieved 
 from https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4054581/ 
Hameleers, M., Bos, L., & de Vreese, C. H. (2017). “They did it”: The effects of 
 emotionalized blame attribution in populist communication. Communication 
 Research, 44(6), 870- 900. https://doi.org/10.1177/0093650216644026 
29 
PREDICTORS OF POPULIST ATTITUDES ACROSS EUROPE 
  
 
Hameleers, M. (2018). A typology of populism: Toward a revised theoretical framework on 
 the sender side and receiver side of communication. International Journal of 
 Communication, 12, 20. Retrieved from 
 https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/7456/2353 
Heiss, R., & Matthes, J. (2019). Stuck in a nativist spiral: Content, selection, and effects of 
 right-wing populists’ communication on Facebook. Political Communication, 1-26. 
 https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2019.1661890 
Hochschild, A. R. (2018). Strangers in their own land: Anger and mourning on the American 
 right. New York: The New Press. 
Hodson, G., & Busseri, M. A. (2012). Bright minds and dark attitudes: Lower cognitive 
 ability predicts greater prejudice through right-wing ideology and low intergroup 
 contact. Psychological science, 23(2), 187-195. 
 https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797611421206 
Hogg, M. A. (2001a). Social categorization, depersonalization, and group behavior. 
 Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology: Group Processes (pp. 56–85). DOI: 
 10.1002/9780470998458.ch3  
Hogg, M. A. (2001b). A social identity theory of leadership. Personality and Social 
 Psychology Review, 5(3), 184–200. DOI: 10.1207/S15327957PSPR0503_1  
Hu, L. T., & Bentler, P. M. (1999). Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure 
 analysis: Conventional criteria versus new alternatives. Structural equation modeling: 
 a multidisciplinary journal, 6(1), 1-55. https://doi.org/10.1080/10705519909540118 
Jay, S., Batruch, A., Jetten, J., McGarty, C., & Muldoon, O. T. (2019). Economic inequality 
 and the rise of far-right populism: A social psychological analysis. Journal of 
 Community & Applied Social Psychology, 29(5), 418-428. 
James, G., Witten, D., Hastie, T., & Tibshirani, R. (2017). An Introduction to Statistical 
30 
PREDICTORS OF POPULIST ATTITUDES ACROSS EUROPE 
  
 
 Learning (Vol. 112, pp. 15-57). New York: Springer. 
Johnson, T. P., & Van de Vijver, F. J. (2003). Social desirability in cross-cultural 




Kešić, J., & Duyvendak, J. W. (2019). The nation under threat: secularist, racial and populist 
 nativism in the Netherlands. Patterns of Prejudice, 1-23. 
 https://doi.org/10.1080/0031322X.2019.1656886 
Kline, R. B. (2015). Principles and Practice of Structural Equation Modeling (2nd 
 edition). New York: Guilford. 
Krämer, B. (2014). Media populism: A conceptual clarification and some theses on its 
 effects. Communication Theory, 24, 42-60. https://doi.org/10.1111/comt.12029 
Lazarus, R. S. (2001). Relational meaning and discrete emotions. In K. R. Scherer, A. Schorr, 
 & T. Johnstone (Eds.), Appraisal processes in emotion: Theory, methods, research 
 (pp. 37– 67). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.  
Lee, T. H., Ullah, A., & Wang, R. (2020). Bootstrap Aggregating and Random Forest. 
 In Macroeconomic Forecasting in the Era of Big Data (pp. 389-429). Springer, 
 Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31150-6_13 
Lerner, J. S., Li, Y., Valdesolo, P., & Kassam, K. S. (2015). Emotion and decision 
 making. Annual review of psychology 66, 799-823. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-
 psych-010213-115043 
Lindström, M. (2020). Populism and health inequality in high-income countries. SSM-
 Population Health, 100574. https://dx.doi.org/10.1016%2Fj.ssmph.2020.100574 
Lubbers, M., Gijsberts, M., & Scheepers, P. (2002). Extreme right-wing voting in Western 
31 
PREDICTORS OF POPULIST ATTITUDES ACROSS EUROPE 
  
 
 Europe. European Journal of Political Research, 41(3), 345-378. 
 https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.00015 
MacKinnon, D. P., Fairchild, A. J., & Fritz, M. S. (2007). Mediation analysis. Annu. Rev. 
 Psychol., 58, 593-614. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.58.110405.085542 
Moors, A., Ellsworth, P. C., Scherer, K. R., & Frijda, N. H. (2013). Appraisal theories of 
 emotion: State of the art and future development. Emotion Review, 5(2), 119-124. 
 https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073912468165 
Mudde, C. (2012). The relationship between immigration and nativism in Europe and North 
 America. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. 
 https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/TCM-relationship-between-immigration-
 nativism 
Nai, A. (2018). Fear and loathing in populist campaigns? Comparing the communication 
 style of populists and non-populists in elections worldwide. Journal of Political 
 Marketing, 1-32. https://doi.org/10.1080/15377857.2018.1491439 
Nguyen, C. G. (2019, March 13). Emotions and Populist Support.
 https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/e2wm6 
Oesch, D. (2008). Explaining workers' support for right-wing populist parties in Western 
 Europe: Evidence from Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, and 
 Switzerland. International Political Science Review, 29(3), 349-373. 
 https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512107088390 
Orrù, G., Monaro, M., Conversano, C., Gemignani, A., & Sartori, G. (2020). Machine 
 learning in psychometrics and psychological research. Frontiers in Psychology, 10, 
 2970. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02970 
Qualtrics. (2019). Qualtrics. Provo, UT: Qualtrics. Retrieved from  http://www.qualtrics.com 
Rhodes-Purdy, M., Navarre, R., & Utych, S (2020). Populist psychology: economics, culture, 
32 
PREDICTORS OF POPULIST ATTITUDES ACROSS EUROPE 
  
 
 and emotions. The Journal of Politics (forthcoming).
 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/343385670_Populist_psychology_economic
 s_culture_and_emotions 
Rico, G., Guinjoan, M., & Anduiza, E. (2017). The emotional underpinnings of populism: 
 how anger and fear affect populist attitudes. Swiss Political Science Review, 23(4), 
 444-461. https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12261 
Rico, G., Guinjoan, M., & Anduiza, E. (2020). Empowered and enraged: Political efficacy, 
 anger and support for populism in Europe. European Journal of Political Research. 
 https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12374 
Roets, A., & Van Hiel, A. (2011). Item selection and validation of a brief, 15-item version of 
 the Need for Closure Scale. Personality and Individual Differences, 50(1), 90-94. 
 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2010.09.004 
Rooduijn, M., & Akkerman, T. (2017). Flank attacks: Populism and left-right radicalism in 
 Western Europe. Party Politics, 23(3), 193-204. 
 https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068815596514  
Rooduijn, M., & Burgoon, B. (2018). The paradox of well-being: do unfavorable 
 socioeconomic and sociocultural contexts deepen or dampen radical left and right 
 voting among the less well-off?. Comparative Political Studies, 51(13), 1720-1753. 
 https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414017720707 
Roseman, I. J. (1984). Cognitive determinants of emotion: A structural theory. 
 In P. Shaver (Ed.), Review of personality and social psychology (Vol. 5, pp. 11–
 36). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.  
Rosseel, Y. (2012). Lavaan: An R package for structural equation modeling and more. 
 Version 0.5–12 (BETA). Journal of statistical software, 48(2), 1-36. 
 https://doi.org/10.18637/jss.v048.i02 
33 
PREDICTORS OF POPULIST ATTITUDES ACROSS EUROPE 
  
 
Salmela, M., & von Scheve, C. (2017). Emotional roots of right-wing political populism. 
 Social Science Information, 56(4), 567-595. 
 https://doi.org/10.1177/0539018417734419 
Salmela, M., & von Scheve, C. (2018). Emotional dynamics of right-and left-wing political 
 populism. Humanity & Society, 42(4), 434-454. 
 https://doi.org/10.1177/0160597618802521 
Schaub, M., & Morisi, D. (2019). Voter mobilisation in the echo chamber: Broadband 
 internet and the rise of populism in Europe. European Journal of Political Research. 
 59(4), 752-773. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12373 
Scherer, K. R., Schorr, A., & Johnstone, T. (Eds.). (2001). Appraisal processes in emotion: 
 Theory, methods, research. Oxford University Press. 
Schulz, A., Müller, P., Schemer, C., Wirz, D. S., Wettstein, M., & Wirth, W. (2017). 
 Measuring populist attitudes on three dimensions. International Journal of Public 
 Opinion Research, 30(2), 316-326. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edw037 
Schulz, A., Wirth, W., & Müller, P. (2018). We Are the People and You Are Fake News: A 
 Social Identity Approach to Populist Citizens’ False Consensus and Hostile Media 
 Perceptions. Communication Research, 0093650218794854. 
 https://doi.org/10.1177/0093650218794854 
Smith, H. J., & Ortiz, D. J. (2002). Is it just me?: The different consequences of personal and 
 group relative deprivation. In I. Walker & H. J. Smith (Eds.), Relative deprivation: 
 Specification, development, and integration (p. 91–115). Cambridge University Press. 
 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511527753.005 
Sprong, S., Jetten, J., Wang, Z., Peters, K., Mols, F., Verkuyten, M., ... & Wohl, M.J.A. 
 (2019). “Our country needs a strong leader right now”: economic inequality enhances 
 the wish for a strong leader. Psychological Science, 30(11), 1625-1637. 
34 




Stephan, W. G., Ybarra, O., & Morrison, K. R. (2009). Intergroup threat theory. In T. D. 
 Nelson (Ed.), Handbook of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination (pp. 43–59). 
 New York, NY: Psychology Press. Taylor and Francis Group. 
 https://doi.org/10.4324/9781841697772 
Streeck, W. (2017). The Return of the Repressed, New Left Review, 104, 5-18. Retrieved 
 from https://pure.mpg.de/rest/items/item_2434338/component/file_2583687/content 
Swank, D., & Betz, H. G. (2003). Globalization, the welfare state and right-wing populism in 
 Western Europe. Socio-Economic Review, 1(2), 215-245. 
 https://doi.org/10.1093/soceco/1.2.215 
Tausch, N., Becker, J. C., Spears, R., Christ, O., Saab, R., Singh, P., & Siddiqui, R. N. 
 (2011). Explaining radical group behavior: Developing emotion and efficacy routes to 
 normative and nonnormative collective action. Journal of personality and social 
 psychology, 101(1), 129. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0022728 
de Vreese, C. H., Esser, F., Aalberg, T., Reinemann, C., & Stanyer, J. (2018). Populism as an 
 expression of political communication content and style: A new perspective. The 
 International Journal of Press/Politics, 23(4), 423-438. 
 https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161218790035 
Wirth, W., Esser, F., Wettstein, M., Engesser, S., Wirz, D., Schulz, A., & Müller, P. (2016). 
 The appeal of populist ideas, strategies and styles: A theoretical model and research 
 design for analyzing populist political communication. Zurich: NCCR Working 
 Paper,  88. Retrieved from https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/127461/1/WP_88.pdf 
Wirz, D. S. (2018). Persuasion Through Emotion? An Experimental Test of the Emotion-
 Eliciting Nature of Populist Communication. International Journal of 
 Communication, 12, 25. Retrieved from 
35 




Wirz, D. S., Wettstein, M., Schulz, A., Müller, P., Schemer, C., Ernst, N., Esser, F. & Wirth, 
 W. (2018). The Effects of Right-Wing Populist Communication on Emotions and 
 Cognitions toward Immigrants. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 23(4), 
 496-516. https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161218788956 
Wolf, E. J., Harrington, K. M., Clark, S. L., & Miller, M. W. (2013). Sample size 
 requirements for structural equation models: An evaluation of power, bias, and 
 solution propriety. Educational and psychological measurement, 73(6), 913-934. 
 https://doi.org/10.1177/0013164413495237 
Zaslove, A., Geurkink, B., Jacobs, K., & Akkerman, A. (2020). Power to the people? 
 Populism, democracy, and political participation: a citizen's perspective. West 
 European Politics, 1-25. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2020.1776490 
